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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 2002, and May 23, 2002, the Minnesota Supreme
Court disappointed all practitioners in the field of land use and
eminent domain with its 3-3 split decisions in Housing and
1
Redevelopment Authority ex rel. City of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc.
2
and Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, respectively. The
Walser decisions have created greater confusion and uncertainty
with respect to standards and precedents for governments,
property owners, and developers. This article reviews the Walser
decisions and some of the uncertainties and problems arising from
them.
† B.A., 1985 Carleton College; J.D., 1991 cum laude, William Mitchell
College of Law. Mr. Larson is an Assistant City Attorney for the City of Saint Paul
practicing in the areas of land use, real estate, and commercial litigation. Prior to
joining the City of Saint Paul’s City Attorney’s Office, Mr. Larson was a partner
with Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota.
1. 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002) (Lancaster, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case).
2. 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002) (Lancaster, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case).
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II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
There are three lawsuits involving Walser Auto Sales, Inc.
(“Walser”), the City of Richfield (“the City”), and Richfield’s
3
Housing and Redevelopment Authority (“the HRA”). All deal with
the City of Richfield’s condemnation of Walser’s property located
along Interstate Highway 494. This article focuses on two of the
three lawsuits.
A. Walser I
Housing and Redevelopment Authority ex rel. City of Richfield v.
4
Walser Auto Sales, Inc., (Walser I) involves the HRA’s condemnation
of Walser’s property as well as other adjacent private property for
the construction of Best Buy Co., Inc.’s (Best Buy) corporate
5
headquarters. Walser argued that taking its private property for
another private party to develop does not meet the constitutional
6
public purpose requirement. Walser also argued that the City’s
motion to dismiss Walser’s public purpose challenge as moot
7
should be denied. The Hennepin County District Court held that
8
the constitutional public purpose requirement was met. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals deferred to the district court’s findings
of fact supporting a legal conclusion that public purpose had been
9
met. The court of appeals also held that the issue of public
10
purpose was not mooted by the quick take condemnation
3. The HRA was the condemning authority and also the financing arm of
the redevelopment project. This article frequently uses the terms “the City” and
“the HRA” interchangeably. However, the author does attempt to ensure that he
has referenced the correct entity involved in the referenced subject matter.
4. 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.
2002) (affirming mootness issue and 3-3 split decision on remaining issues).
5. Walser I, 641 N.W.2d at 887 (Minn. 1987).
6. Id.
7. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d at 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
8. Id. at 668-69.
9. Id. at 665.
10. See M INN. STAT. § 117.042. Under a quick take, the condemning authority
obtains leave from the district court to obtain title to the property immediately
upon the condemning authority depositing with the district court the condemning
authority’s appraised value of the property to be condemned. The purpose is to
obtain title to the property within a given time period so that the condemning
authority can proceed with its project. Otherwise, the condemning authority does
not know when to send out a project to bid, when to begin construction, or when
to budget for a project. Sometimes grant monies or matching funds are available
for a short or definite period of time and a quick take ensures that those monies
can be used for a project. If a quick take is not used to acquire the necessary
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11

resulting in the immediate transfer of title to the City. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed with regards to the mootness
12
issue. But the court was equally divided as to the issues dealing
with public purpose, and therefore the decision of the court of
13
appeals stands. Walser’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the
14
United States Supreme Court was denied on October 21, 2002.
B. Walser II
15

In Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, (hereinafter
“Walser II”) Walser challenged the City’s use of tax-increment
financing to fund the redevelopment project of the new Best Buy
16
headquarters. The district court dismissed Walser’s complaint in
full and awarded the City of Richfield and the HRA attorneys’ fees
17
and costs as the prevailing parties.
The Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court for a
determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees to Walser as the
18
prevailing party. The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted review,
but on May 23, 2002, added to the disappointment of the Walser I
19
decision, by affirming the lower court’s decision without opinion.
The court’s lack of opinion left many issues undecided.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed four issues in
20
Walser II. This article focuses on the court of appeals’ decision on
property, the project may not occur until after grant or matching funds are no
longer available.
11. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d at 671 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
12. Walser I, 641 N.W.2d at 891 (Minn. 2002).
13. Id.
14. Walser v. Housing & Redev. Authority, ___ S.Ct. ___ (Mem) (No. 02-278),
2002 WL 1969300 (Oct. 21, 2002).
15. 635 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn.
2002) (3-3 split decision).
16. 635 N.W.2d at 393.
17. Id. at 392-93 (citing Minnesota Statutes section 469.1771, subdivision
1(a)).
18. Id. at 404.
19. Walser II, 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002).
20. 635 N.W.2d at 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The first issue was whether a
citizen-taxpayer has standing to challenge the inclusion of property within a taxincrement-financing (TIF) district formed before May 15, 2000. The trial court
held that a citizen does not have standing and the court of appeals affirmed the
decision. Id. at 396-98.
The second issue was whether a citizen-taxpayer has standing to challenge
the retention of property within a tax-increment-financing district. Although the
trial court held no, the court of appeals held that Minnesota Statutes section
469.1771, subdivision 2 (2000), provides for a taxpayer lawsuit if the city “includes
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the public purpose standards for public expenditures and does not
address the other issues contained in the courts’ decisions.
C. Walser III
21

In Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. Best Buy Co., Inc., (Walser III)
Walser challenged the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency’s
(MPCA) issuance of an indirect source permit (ISP). Construction
plans included 2,000 parking spaces, therefore Best Buy was
required to obtain an ISP to “insure that carbon monoxide
22
concentrations [would] not exceed state air quality limits.” The
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the MPCA’s issuance of the
23
24
ISP. Walser did not appeal.
or retains a parcel of property in a tax increment financing district that does not
qualify for inclusion or retention within the district.” Id. at 396, 398-99. The City
argued that the amendment to section 469.1771, subdivision 2, upon which Walser
based its standing to sue, was prospective and should not be applied retroactively
so as to confer upon Walser standing to sue for actions that took place prior to the
effective date of section 469.1771, subdivision 2, as amended. Id. at 399. The
court of appeals disagreed, saying that “[a]s the retention of the property
continued past the effective date of the 2000 amendment, prospective application
grants Walser a right to sue for improper retention of property.” Id.
The third issue was whether “the district court’s conclusion that a
particular expenditure was for a ‘public purpose’ [was] sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that all public expenditures be primarily for a public purpose.” Id. at
396. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that public monies can only be used if
the monies primarily serve a public purpose. Id. at 400. The case was remanded
to the district court for findings as to whether the TIF monies were serving a
primarily public purpose. Id.
The fourth issue was whether the redevelopment TIF district was properly
established. Id. at 396. While the trial court held yes, the court of appeals
reversed, holding that the creation of the TIF district was not lawful because “[t]he
record shows that several aspects of the TIF-district creation were fundamentally
flawed.” Id. at 400.
The court of appeals was repeatedly critical of the City’s work in the
establishment of the TIF district:
Tax-increment financing is a power granted to municipalities by the
legislature to be exercised only within the constraints of the legislative
fiat.
Exhibiting a particular municipal meanness, respondents
completely ignored the statutory prerequisites for the exercise of this
financing tool. The provisions of Minn. Stat. § 469.1771 (2000) are
intended to provide a means to ensure that such a blatant disregard for
limits on municipal authority will be answerable.
Id. at 404.
21. No. C6-01-888, 2002 WL 172025 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2002).
22. Id. at *1.
23. Id. at *3.
24. Telephone Interview with Clerk, Minnesota Court of Appeals (Aug. 1,
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III. TAKINGS CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Great excitement resulted from Walser I because the United
States Supreme Court has demonstrated a great interest in eminent
domain cases in the last ten years. The Court has expressed a
willingness to redefine the constitutional standards and precedents
25
in the eminent domain area.
26
In Berman v. Parker, the United States Supreme Court noted
that the United States Constitution imposes only two limitations on
the government’s eminent domain powers: public purpose and just
27
compensation. All other considerations and methods are left to
government discretion:
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain
is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to the end. Once the object is within the authority
of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also
2002) (informing that a petition for review had not been filed). This article does
not address the Walser III decision.
25. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, ___ U.S.
___, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (concluding that the agency’s temporary moratoria on
development did not effect an unconstitutional regulatory takings of property);
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding that acquisition of title
after the effective date of the regulations did not bar a regulatory takings claim);
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999)
(deciding that a landowner has a right to jury trial in a takings claim and the
Dolan’s rough proportionality test is inapposite); Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498 (1998) (5-4 decision) (concluding that the Takings Clause does not apply to
government actions that simply impose a financial obligation without affecting a
specific, identified property interest); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520
U.S. 725 (1997) (considering Suitum’s argument that her property was taken by
the regulations imposed by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (hearing another dedication case seven years after
deciding Nollan); Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (rejecting a regulatory taking claim relying on the
parcel-as-a-whole rule to a challenge to a federal pension plan protections); Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (ruling that a per se taking occurs
where regulation denies a landowner of all economically beneficial use and value
of the land); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (holding that
California zoning law that restricts a mobile home park owner’s ability to
terminate the tenancy of a mobile home owner does not constitute a taking);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (concluding that a beachfront
easement for use by people already on the public beaches constituted a taking
because the dedication did not bear a logical nexus to the harm the California
Coastal Commission sought to address by the easement condition imposed on the
building permit).
26. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
27. Id. at 31-32.
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28

for Congress to determine.
According to Berman, the condemning authority must have lawful
authority to undertake the action, and the legislative body’s public
use determination is afforded deference, unless the determination
29
is shown to involve impossibility. Walser I raised both the legal
authority and the public purpose issues, providing the Minnesota
Supreme Court with an opportunity to redefine the constitutional
limits of the exercise of eminent domain in much the same manner
30
as the United States Supreme Court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court formerly held that the “public
purpose” constitutional standards found in the United States and
31
Minnesota Constitutions are identical. The plain language of the
Minnesota Constitution imposes no higher burdens or
requirements than the United States Constitution, other than that
compensation under the Minnesota Constitution must be “paid or
32
secured” before the taking. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
recently declared Minnesota Statutes sections 163.11-.12
unconstitutional because they provided for the condemnation of
land without judicial review of the public purpose for the
33
condemnation. In Walser I, the Minnesota Supreme Court was
presented with a perfect set of facts to define a clear constitutional
line between public purpose and non-public purpose.
A. HRA’s Legal Authority
Walser raised two questions regarding the legal authority of a
government to condemn. First, how broadly can the statutory
34
authority conferring condemnation powers be interpreted?
Second, how much discretion does the condemning authority
possess in determining whether the conditions required by the
35
statute for the exercise of condemnation powers have been met?
28. Id. at 33 (internal citations omitted).
29. Id. at 32.
30. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
31. City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Minn. 1986).
32. Under the United States Constitution, in relevant part, private property
shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Similarly, the Minnesota Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property
shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation
therefore, first paid or secured.” M INN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added).
33. In re Rapp, 621 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
34. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d at 666-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
35. Id. at 668-70.
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36

Walser argued the two issues separately. However, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals combined the issues in a single analysis and
supported the HRA’s discretion as to the extent of its
condemnation authority and the appropriateness of its exercise in
37
the situation at hand.
This holding is highly favorable to condemning authorities.
The court of appeals deferred to the HRA’s determination that the
project area needed redevelopment due to incompatible uses,
38
traffic congestion, and obsolete structures. The court concluded
that the HRA was authorized to condemn the property, and held
that the record compiled by HRA supports the definition of
“blight” under the statute; however, the HRA never used the
39
statutory language. The court of appeals, consistent with its
deference to the district court’s findings, affirmed that the HRA
had statutory authority to condemn the property in order to
40
eliminate and prevent blight. The court of appeals concluded
41
that the holding was not clearly erroneous.
However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s 3-3 split decision hints at the
uncertainty of the presumed result of Walser’s appeal of the court
of appeals’ decision to uphold the HRA’s use of discretion. In its
Petition for Rehearing to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Walser
noted:
[T]his Court’s 3-3 split fails to answer the question of
whether the government may without limitation condemn
private property if there is any evidence of blight in the
neighborhood (e.g., chipped paint around a window), or
whether the courts should review and weigh the evidence

36. See Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 21, Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885
(Minn. 2002) (No. C8-01-309). In its Petition for Rehearing, Walser argued that
the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to address (1) blight and, separately, (2)
standard of review. However, with respect to the standard of review issue, Walser’s
argument addresses both the sufficiency of the record and the appropriate degree
of deference to be afforded HRA. Walser argued that HRA’s determination of
“blight” should have been reviewed with greater scrutiny in order to ensure that
HRA’s legal authority to condemn is correctly based upon a finding of “blight” as
meant by section 469.002(11). Petition for Rehearing, at 2-3, Housing & Redev.
Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.
2002) (No.C8-01-309).
37. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d at 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
38. Id. at 669.
39. Id. at 668-69.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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as a whole in making their blight determinations.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Walser I is
consistent with previous court decisions granting broad authority
43
and discretion to the government. Walser argued that the record
does not support the HRA’s public purpose determination because
the HRA failed to find that any of the properties in the project area
44
were “blighted.” However, this argument failed. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has consistently held that the government’s
determination of public purpose will be upheld as long as there is
“some evidence, however informal” supporting the public purpose
45
determination. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision was in
accordance with such a presumption.
Under Minnesota statutes, an HRA can only exercise eminent
domain powers where blighted conditions “exist which cannot be
46
redeveloped without government assistance.” Appellant Walser
argued that the HRA’s eminent domain authority is limited to the
authority clearly expressed by the statute: “HRAs take private
property from one owner and often convey it to another. The
legislature therefore imposed specific limitations on an HRA’s
authority to condemn, to ensure that an authorized public purpose
47
will be met.” Walser sought a narrow definition of “blight” and a
high degree of scrutiny as to whether the HRA had presented

42. Walser’s Petition for Rehearing, filed April 29, 2002, at 2.
43. See Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 259 Minn. 1, 1415, 104 N.W.2d 864, 874 (1960) (stating that a condemning authority’s
determination that a particular area is “blighted” or that the redevelopment serves
a “public use” will not be tampered with unless the court determines that the
authority’s finding was “fraudulent or capricious, or, in some instances, unless the
evidence against the finding is overwhelming”).
44. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d at 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
45. Id. (citing In re Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency (MCDA) v. Opus, N.W.,
LLC, 582 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29,
1998); City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1986); Housing &
Redev. Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 259 Minn. 1, 15, 104 N.W.2d 864, 874
(1960)).
46. M INN. STAT. § 469.003 (2000). Walser also argued that the taking violated
the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), under chapter 116D. Walser I,
630 N.W.2d at 667 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The court of appeals quickly disposed
of this argument noting that under Minnesota Rule 4410.3100, subdivision 2, the
government may take property prior to the completion of any environmental
review unless the taking “will prejudice the ultimate decision on the project” and
that Walser had not presented any evidence of prejudice. Id. at 667.
47. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 21, Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.
2002) (No. C8-01-309).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/14

8

Larson: The Walser Decisions and Constitutional Condemnation Conundrums
FINAL L ARSON WALSER(OCT 18 PM). DOC

2002]

10/28/2002 10:53 PM

THE WALSER DECISIONS AND CONDEMNATION

507

48

sufficient evidence of the existence of “blight.” Walser conceded
that “[t]he issues on this appeal relate largely to the question of
49
‘blight.’”
Walser raised several questions centered on the definition of
“blight.” First, Walser questioned questioned whether the property
being condemned had to meet the definition of blight, or whether
it was sufficient for the property to be located within a blighted
50
area. Next, Walser asked if a property or project area could meet
the definition of blight if the properties themselves were in good
condition, but the condemning unit determined that (a) the mix
of uses was incompatible; (b) there were traffic problems; and (c)
51
the buildings and property use were “obsolete.” Finally, Walser’s
brief posed the question of whether the record could support a
public purpose finding when the HRA had never made a specific
52
finding that Walser’s property or the project area was blighted.
Alternatively, the HRA sought a very expansive definition of
blight, arguing that if non-blighted property is located in a
redevelopment project area that is blighted, public purpose is
53
met.
The HRA also asserted that it was empowered under
Minnesota statutes “to acquire blight areas and other real property
for the purpose of removing, preventing, or reducing blight,
54
blighting factors, or the causes of blight.” Under this definition,
the project area does not presently have to be in a blight condition.
It is sufficient if acquisition of the real property will further the
55
removal, prevention, or reduction of blight in the project area.
The HRA also argued that the definition of “blight” includes
56
the need to increase the tax base and job development. It
claimed that the law does not specifically require a blight finding,
and regardless, the HRA’s finding that many of the structures in
48. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d at 669 (Minn.Ct. App. 2001).
49. Brief and Appendix for Appellants at 10, Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.
2002) (No. C8-01-309).
50. Id. at 10-11.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 6, 13-14.
53. Brief and Appendix for Respondent at 35-39, Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885
(Minn. 2002) (No. C8-01-309).
54. Id. at 39.
55. Id. (arguing that “[t]he City has no choice but to redevelop existing
underutilized areas, and the consequence of failure to do so could be severe
stagnation”).
56. Id. at 42 (citing City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn.
1986)).
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the project area were “structurally substandard” constitutes a blight
57
finding because building deficiency is an element of “blight.”
The City presented evidence of the project area’s deteriorated
condition. Although Walser’s buildings were “not necessarily
obsolete for their present or continued uses . . . [they] are
functionally obsolete for commercial spaces serving the public
patron and lack certain life safety factors, elements with the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and . . . mechanical systems
58
essential for quality tenant space.”
The City also submitted
evidence that Walser’s automobile dealership constituted an
incompatible use. The “hazardous traffic patterns, merging and
‘jockeying’ vehicles on narrow streets, the existence of diverter
barriers and . . . [the lack of] adequate parking facilities . . .
imped[ed] the smooth flow of traffic in an area lacking adequate
59
infrastructure.”
The Minnesota appellate courts were unlikely to, and did not,
hold that the condemned property itself had to be blighted. HRAs
can clearly acquire “blighted areas and other real property” to
60
address the blight issues. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals could have explicitly indicated that condemned property
itself did not have to be blighted as long as the record indicated the
acquisition addressed blight issues. However, the court described
61
its role as “narrow.”
It refrained from straying beyond
determining whether the district court clearly erred in accepting
the HRA’s public purpose application. The court of appeals thus
held that the district court had not clearly erred in its finding that
the taking was for a public purpose; and that the HRA had the
authority to condemn Walser’s property “to eliminate and prevent
62
blight.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 3-3 decision left the court of
appeals decision intact. Government and private property owners
are left to speculate as to the problems with the court of appeals’
decision discerned by three justices of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. For instance, these justices believed the court should have
subjected the HRA’s discretion as to what constitutes “blighted” to
57. Id. at 37.
58. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
59. Id.
60. M INN. STAT. § 469.002(14)(1) (2000).
61. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d at 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting County of
Dakota v. City of Lakeville, 559 N.W.2d 716, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)).
62. Id. at 669.
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greater scrutiny. Furthermore, other requirements imposed by
statute as a condition to exercising eminent domain power should
be subject to a narrower construction or stricter review. Walser
characterized current deference to the HRA:
[Under the] trial court’s approach, if an HRA can find a
consultant or staff person who, innocently or otherwise,
will say that ‘black is white,’ the trial court must likewise
find that black is white because according to the court, it
is not arbitrary and63 capricious for an HRA to rely on its
staff or consultants.
The 3-3 split at the Minnesota Supreme Court indicates that some
of the justices sympathized with Walser’s view.
B. Primary Public Purpose
A condemning authority must meet the constitutional
64
requirement that the condemnation serve a public purpose.
Walser argued that the constitutional standard in its case was one of
65
“primary public purpose.” Walser claimed that public purpose
was not met here under the application of a “primary” public
66
purpose or any other articulated public purpose standard. Walser
raised the same argument in Walser II, arguing that monies
67
expended by the HRA must first be for a primary public purpose.
In Walser I, public purpose was met; and the court did not directly
address Walser’s argument that “primary” public purpose is the
68
preferred constitutional standard. In Walser II, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s determination that
public purpose was met and applied the “primary public purpose”
69
standard. The result of these decisions is that the government
may lawfully take a landowner’s property if public monies are not
expended and the taking serves a public purpose. However, the
public purpose being served does not have to be primary.
70
Relying on City of Duluth v. State, Walser argued in Walser I
that when the government transfers private property via eminent
63.
01-309).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Brief for Appellant at 14, Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002) (No. C8Id. at 6.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24-28.
Walser II, 635 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Minn. 2002).
Walser I, 630 N.W.2d 662, 668-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
Walser II, 635 N.W.2d at 399-400 (Minn. 2002).
390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986).
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domain from one private landowner to another private landowner,
the government must show that the public purpose being served is
primary or predominant as compared to the private purpose being
71
served:
The revitalization of deteriorating urban areas and the
alleviation of unemployment are certainly public goals.
There is little doubt, however, that the exercise of the
city’s eminent domain powers in this case will also benefit
the private interests of the owners of the paper mill. In
light of this court’s decision in Wurtele, however, this fact
alone does not make the use of such eminent domain
powers unconstitutional. As long as the predominant
purpose being furthered is a public one, the
condemnation is constitutional under Minn. Const. art. 1,
§ 13 and, in light of the Hawaii Housing Authority case, is
valid under the United States Constitution as72 well in
meeting the federal requirement of public use.
A public purpose is easily demonstrated if the government retains
ownership of the property. If the condemning authority is merely
acting as the straw person, then the public purpose is more
obscure. Walser unsuccessfully argued that in instances such as City
of Duluth, the courts recognized a stricter standard for condemning
authorities by articulating the “predominant” public purpose
standard. Walser’s argument that the constitutional standard
should be primary public purpose when the condemning authority
transfers property from one private entity to another was consistent
73
with Minnesota’s prior use of terms for condemnation. In sum,
71. Appellants’ Brief at 6, Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002) (No. C8-01309).
72. City of Duluth, 390 N.W.2d at 763-64 (bold emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
73. In Lieser v. Town of St. Martin, 255 Minn. 153, 96 N.W.2d 1 (1959), the
Minnesota Supreme Court held:
[A]ll questions in respect to the propriety and necessity of the
particular improvement are legislative in character and the
determination thereof by the local tribunal is final and will be set aside
by the court on statutory appeal only when it appears that the evidence is
practically conclusive against it, or that the local board proceeded on an
erroneous theory of law, or that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously against the
best interests of the public.
255 Minn. at 158-59, 96 N.W.2d at 5-6 (emphasis added). In Housing & Redev.
Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 259 Minn. 1, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960), the Minnesota
Supreme Court defined its role regarding the issue of public use as follows:
While it may be conceded that courts have generally disclaimed the
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the court inconsistently applied the evidentiary standard. The
court has stated that the evidentiary standard is “some evidence,
74
however, informal,” and also as “utter disregard of the public
75
76
necessity of its use,” “practically conclusive against it,” and
77
“showing of bad faith or tainted motive.”
In Walser I, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did not expressly
address Walser’s argument that the correct review standard under
the constitution is primary purpose. However, the court of appeals
rejected Walser’s argument that the evidence did not support the
78
finding that the taking served a public purpose. The court noted
that a district court must give “[g]reat weight” to a condemning
79
authority’s public purpose determination. As long as “the record
contains some evidence, however informal, that the taking serves a
80
public purpose, there is nothing left for the courts . . . .” The
court stated that “public purpose and necessity are questions of
fact, and the district court’s decisions on these matters will not be
81
reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.”
In contrast, the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the
power of supervising the selection of a site for public improvements,
nevertheless they are reluctant to surrender their right to prevent an
abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature by an attempted
appropriation of land in utter disregard of the public necessity of its use.
259 Minn. at 15, 104 N.W.2d at 874 (emphasis added). The court further stated,
“[i]f it appears that the record contains some evidence, however, informal, that the
taking serves a public purpose, there is nothing left for the courts to pass upon.”
Id. (emphasis added). The court articulated the judicial review standard as abuse
of discretion standard determined by whether there has been an “utter disregard
of the public necessity.” However, if the government can show “some evidence”
even if informally presented, then the public purpose requirement is met. Eight
years later, the court decided Metropolitan Sewer Board v. Thiss, 294 Minn. 228, 200
N.W.2d 396 (1972), and found that “[t]his court has always held that the propriety
of the exercise of eminent domain is a legislative question.” Id. at 230, 200 N.W.2d
at 397 (citing City of Austin v. Wright, 262 Minn. 301, 114 N.W.2d 584 (1962)).
Here, the Minnesota Supreme Court imposes the practically conclusive standard
against the public purpose evidentiary standard. See City of Minneapolis v.
Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Minn. 1980) (acknowledging that “[w]e have said a
municipality’s finding of public purpose can be negated by a showing of bad faith
or tainted motive”).
74. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 259 Minn. at 15, 104 N.W.2d at 874.
75. Id. at 14, 104 N.W.2d at 874.
76. Lieser, 255 Minn. at 159, 96 N.W.2d at 5-6.
77. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d at 390.
78. Walser I, 630 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
79. Id. at 666.
80. Id. at 668-69.
81. Id. at 666.
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primary public purpose standard in Walser II. The court of appeals
held that “the existence of almost any evidence will support a
82
finding of a public purpose” in condemnation cases. However,
with respect to public expenditures, the public purpose must be
shown to be “primary,” requiring a “more stringent evidentiary
83
standard.”
“[N]ot only must the quantity of the evidence
considered be greater, but the quality of the analysis must be
84
different.” The expenditure of funds requires a comparative
approach; that is to say, analysis of which purpose (public or
85
private) is the primary purpose.”
86
The term “primary purpose” originated in Visina v. Freeman.
There the court held that the mere fact that some private interest
may derive an incidental benefit from the activity does not deprive
87
the activity of its public nature if its primary purpose is public. As
evidenced by the Walser I and II decisions, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has adopted the reasoning articulated in Visina.
82. Walser II, 635 N.W.2d 391, 400, n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals cited Port Authority of St. Paul v.
Fisher, 269 Minn. 276, 288, 132 N.W.2d 183, 192 (1964) and Visina v. Freeman, 252
Minn. 177, 184, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (1958) to support its decision.
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned:
“Public use,” as required for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, is not necessarily synonymous with “public purpose” required
for the expenditure of public money. It may be safe to assume that, if the
activity constitutes a public purpose which will justify the expenditure of
public money, it also constitutes a public purpose which will permit the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it does not necessarily
follow that, if the use to be made of the property is a public use within
the meaning of our eminent domain statutes and laws, it also constitutes
a public purpose for which public money may be spent. We have, for
instance, frequently granted railroads and other public utilities, and even
private persons, the right to condemn private property for a use declared
to be public, but it does not follow that public money may be spent to
assist such condemnors in carrying out the purpose for which the
condemnation is permitted. However, the cases relied on here, involving
the rights of ports or port authorities of one kind or another to condemn
property, are of such a nature that the use of the term “public use” or
“public purpose” authorizing condemnation is broad enough to
encompass a public purpose permitting the expenditure of public
money, not because it is a public use which will justify an exercise of the
power of public eminent domain but, in a broader sense, because it is
such a public purpose as includes, as well, the right to spend public
money.
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The Port Authority of St. Paul v. Fisher case provides little
instruction. Nowhere in Fisher does the Minnesota Supreme Court
use the term “primary public purpose.” The omission is
unfortunate because Fisher addressed both public expenditure and
88
condemnation.
In Fisher, the Saint Paul Port Authority proposed to lease
89
certain property to American Hoist & Derrick Company.
Buildings and other structures were to be constructed on the
property to be used as office buildings, an engineering research
center, a manufacturing facility, a restaurant, and an automobile
parking lot, connected by a tunnel which was to lead to other
property owned or leased by American Hoist on an adjacent
90
block. The costs of construction were to be paid from the sale of
91
Port Authority revenue bonds in the amount of $1.2 million. Fred
W. Fisher, one of the six Port Authority Commissioners and the
president of the Saint Paul Port Authority, refused to sign the
necessary documents on the grounds that in violation of the
Constitution and Minnesota Chapter 458, the deal was serving
92
private purposes and not public purposes. The Port Authority
initiated a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination
that a public purpose was being served by the deal and therefore
93
met statutory and constitutional requirements.
In Fisher, the Minnesota Supreme Court framed the issue
before it as follows: “The issue presented is whether the proposed
lease and revenue bond issuance are unconstitutional because
violative of either Minn. Const. Art. 9, § 1, which provides:
‘Taxes . . . shall be levied and collected for public purposes,’ or the
often stated principle that public money can only be expended for
94
public purposes.” The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to
consider the constitutionality of the Port Authority’s acquisition of
the property because the Port Authority had already acquired the
95
property. Having decided that the public purpose constitutional
question was moot, the Fisher court did not provide a comparative
“public purpose” analysis to discern what differences exist, if any, in
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Fisher, 132 N.W.2d at 195-96.
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id.
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the constitutional standards or the application of these standards
for condemnation versus public expenditure. The single reference
to the term “primary” is contained earlier in the Fisher decision with
no further analysis:
The mere fact that some private interests may derive an
incidental benefit from the activity does not deprive the
activity of its public nature if its primary purpose is public.
On the other hand, [i]f the primary object is to promote some
private end, the expenditure is illegal,
although it may
96
incidentally also serve some public purpose.
By highlighting the last sentence in italics, the Minnesota Supreme
Court clearly believed that the last sentence was important and
deserved great weight, especially since the case was reversed and
remanded to the district court for a reevaluation of public
97
purpose.
What the Walser I and II decisions leave uncertain is whether
the Minnesota Supreme Court will apply the principle articulated
in Fisher to condemnations. If the court were to apply the Fisher
principle, condemnation would not be allowed if the primary
object was to promote some private purpose, despite the incidental
public purpose that resulted. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
failed to apply this principle in Walser I. Alternatively, if the
Minnesota Supreme Court overrules Visina and Fisher as to public
expenditures for condemnations, then if public purpose is met for
the condemnation, it naturally follows that public purpose is met
for the public expenditure for the acquisition of the property. The
3-3 split decision leaves these issues unresolved.
Application of the Walser I and II decisions illustrates the
problem posed by two different constitutional public purpose
standards, one for condemnation and the other for public
expenditures. In Walser I, the court determined that the public
98
purpose constitutional requirement had been met. Accordingly,
99
the City’s condemnation was lawful. In Walser II, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals remanded for a determination as to whether the
public purpose constitutional requirement had been met to
100
finance the project. The rule of reciprocal vesting was triggered
96. Id. at 192 (emphasis added) (citing Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89
N.W.2d 635 (1958)).
97. Id.
98. Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn. 2002).
99. Id.
100. Walser II, 635 N.W.2d 391, 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
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when the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decision in Walser I,
which left undisturbed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision
that the public purpose requirement was met. It is conceivable that
the district court could determine on remand that the TIF
financing is unlawful, resulting in an odd circumstance where the
condemnation is constitutional, but the City would not have the
money to complete it. Under such a circumstance, Walser would
be entitled to “just compensation” from the condemning authority
(the HRA), but the HRA could not expend public monies for the
101
acquisition via TIF district financing. Furthermore, if the district
court determined that primary public purpose was not met and if
Walser I and II are strictly applied, the City may be precluded from
using its staff or attorneys to condemn the property, because such
use could constitute an unlawful expenditure of public resources.
It is ironic that one of the powers of government, taking private
property, could be exercised by a private person with government
serving as a mere straw person. A better policy would be to create a
single public purpose standard for both the acquisition of and the
condemnation of private property.
In the Minnesota Supreme Court’s split decision, three justices
were troubled either by the public purpose standards articulated by
the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Walser I and II or by the
application of those standards. Unfortunately, the lack of a written
opinion leads only to speculation over the public purpose standard
and its application.
IV. MOOTNESS
On the issue of mootness, the Minnesota Supreme Court and
the Minnesota Court of Appeals were clear. Walser’s appeal was
not mooted by the quick take transfer of property to Richfield
102
HRA.
In its Amicus Brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
League of Minnesota Cities said: “If this Court does not reverse the
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals’ decision on this issue, title to condemned
property will become uncertain because of the risk that
condemned property could be returned to its original owner even

101. Whether Best Buy and the City of Richfield have negotiated alternative
financing contingencies to address such financing issues is unknown.
102. See Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn. 2002); Walser I, 630 N.W.2d. 662,
665 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
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103

after title has been transferred.”
The Minnesota County
Attorney’s Association wrote in its Amicus Curiae Brief to the
Court: “Because of the chilling effect on public use of the land
pending the outcome of final appeals, the result is devastating to
condemning authorities. It certainly places private interests over
104
the public interest and proven public need.”
In Walser I, the
supreme court placed private interest over public interest and
affirmed the court of appeals’ rejection of the affirmative mootness
defense. The court held that “if transfer of title were held to moot
any challenge to the public purpose, all condemning authorities
could insulate the public purpose requirement from judicial review
by utilizing the quick-take procedures. This is a rigid rule that does
105
not always satisfy our test for mootness.”
The court’s ruling creates problems for government units
engaged in development projects. This ruling provides assurance
to private property owners that their property will be returned to
106
them, even if the appellate process lasts for years.
The HRA argued that Walser’s public purpose challenge was
moot because either (1) transfer of title had been made so that the
rights of both parties were reciprocally vested; or (2) events
subsequent to the transfer of title had rendered Walser’s public
107
purpose challenge moot.
108
The court in State ex rel. McFarland v. Erskine explained that
according to the reciprocal vesting doctrine, the government’s
right to the property and the landowner’s right to compensation
109
simultaneously vest upon final termination of the proceedings.
In Walser I, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that reciprocal
vesting does not occur until a final, nonappealable determination is
110
made on the public purpose issue.
Since the issue of “public
103. Amicus Brief of the League of Minnesota Cities, at 4, Walser I, 641 N.W.2d
885 (Minn. 2002) (No. C8-01-309).
104. Amicus Brief of the Minnesota County Attorney’s Ass’n, at 6, Walser I, 641
N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002) (No. C8-01-309).
105. Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Minn. 2002).
106. The author does not know when the quick take condemnation action was
initiated by the HRA. The appeal process from the district court to the Minnesota
Supreme Court took more than a year. The Minnesota Court of Appeals decided
Walser I on July 3, 2001, and the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the case on
April 18, 2002.
107. Walser I, 641 N.W.2d at 888-89 (Minn. 2002).
108. 165 Minn. 303, 306, 206 N.W. 447, 448 (1925).
109. Id. at 306, 206 N.W. at 449.
110. Walser I, 641 N.W.2d at 889 (Minn. 2002). “As for the public purpose
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purpose” was part of Walser’s appeal, a final, nonappealable
determination had not been obtained. Accordingly, to reject the
HRA’s mootness argument, the supreme court’s analysis needed
only to note that the reciprocal vesting doctrine was not triggered.
Curiously, the court also suggested that the adjective “reciprocal” in
the reciprocal vesting doctrine was a misnomer in that “the
reciprocal vesting doctrine was invoked to enforce an owner’s right
to payment when the condemning authority, without the consent
of the landowner, sought to abandon, dismiss, or discontinue the
111
condemnation proceedings.”
More noteworthy is that both the court of appeals and the
supreme court ignored the due process arguments raised by the
HRA. Traditionally, the appellant, to retain its appellate rights,
which may be mooted by future conduct, must obtain a stay by
applying for and posting a supersedeas bond with the district
112
court.
Walser had failed to obtain a stay or post the necessary
supersedeas bond, and therefore, the HRA argued that Walser
113
should only be entitled to monetary damages.
The expected outcome under these circumstances is that
failure to obtain a stay or post a bond, title to property becomes
irrevocably transferred to HRA and Walser lost its remedy of the
114
return of property.
Similarly, Walser could have sought an
challenge, we refused to ‘close the door’ to a landowner’s raising the question of
whether the taking was for a public purpose and instead considered the
appropriateness of summary judgment in light of the facts in the case.” Id. at 890
(discussing Hennepin County v. Mikulay, 292 Minn. 200, 209, 194 N.W.2d 259, 265
(1972)).
111. Id.
112. See M INN. R. CIV. APP. P. 108.01. See also Kilowatt Org. v. Dep’t of Energy,
Planning, & Dev., 336 N.W.2d 529, 532-33 (Minn. 1983) (finding that appellant
was not denied due process merely because the district court imposed a high
monetary bond).
113. See Walser I, 641 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 2002).
114. In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota Humane Society v.
Clark, 184 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1999), declined to vacate the district court judgment
after the case became moot during the pendency of an appeal. The court noted:
The Humane Society also could have sought an expedited appeal, a
remedy which this court has granted in the past. See, e.g., Henderson v.
Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)
(appeal heard three days after action filed); South Dakota v. Hazen, 914
F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1990) (appeal heard within seven days of grant
of preliminary injunction). When a party has these legal avenue
available, but does not utilize them, the action is not one that evades
review. See Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Craig, 163 F.3d 482, 485 (8th Cir.
1998) (referring to availability of preliminary injunctions, emergency
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expedited appeal including a review of the bond amount, which
may have avoided the mootness issue.
The posting of a supersedeas bond or a request for a stay on
other grounds is not required for an appeal to be perfected or to
proceed. However, if the order or judgment that is the subject of
the appeal is not generally stayed automatically, then a matter may,
in some circumstances, become moot while the appeal is
115
pending.
On January 19, 2001, the district court authorized a quick take,
subject to Walser’s right to complete its lease which ended on June
116
15, 2001.
The court also ordered transfer of title to the HRA
upon deposit of the approved appraised value of the property with
117
the court and the appropriate recording agency. On February
16, 2001, Walser appealed, but did not move for a stay or a leave to
post a supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the judgment until
118
March 9, 2001. The court denied Walser’s request for a stay and
119
set the supersedeas bond in the amount of $15 million dollars.
The court stayed effect of its order for 48 hours allowing Walser
120
time to appeal. Walser did not appeal the court’s denial of the
121
stay or the supersedeas bond amount. Richfield HRA transferred
122
title to Best Buy on March 16, 2001.
In Walser I, the supreme court noted that Walser appealed
neither the district court’s supersedeas bond amount nor the
denial of a stay. Instead, the court focused solely on the legal effect
and meaning of reciprocal vesting in terms of Minnesota Statutes
Chapter 117 and the constitutional public purpose requirement.
The court repeatedly emphasized that the government’s right to
the property does not vest until a final termination of the
stays, and expedited appeals and holding that case was not one evading
review when plaintiff did not seek expedited review and relief);
Neighborhood Transp. Network, Inc. v. Pena, 42 F.3d 1169, 1173 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that case was not one evading review when party could
have sought, but did not seek, injunction pending review of denial of
preliminary inunction).
Id. at 797.
115. M INN. R. CIV. APP. P. 108.01, advisory committee note (1998
Amendments).
116. Walser I, 641 N.W.2d at 887-88 (Minn. 2002).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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proceedings on public purpose and “if [the government] took the
property in an unconstitutional manner,” then the government
123
“may be compelled to return all or part of [the] property.” The
courts were faced with applying traditional common law outcomes
which conflicted with constitutional mandates.
However,
appellants such as Walser have waived their constitutional appellate
issues by failing to preserve them, resulting in the mootness of the
124
appeal.
Under the Walser I decision, unlike traditional district court
actions, landowners in a condemnation action do not need to seek
a stay or supersedeas bond amount to preserve their appellate
rights. While the government can still affect immediate transfer of
title, it can no longer be certain that the project will proceed
uninterrupted by condemnation proceedings. Instead, the
condemning authority has to concern itself with the possibility that
it may have to return the property to the original landowner in its
pre-developed status if the court later determines that no public
purpose exists. Thus, the Walser I decision holds that the mootness
doctrine does not apply in condemnation cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The Walser I and II decisions raised a number of central
condemnation and government redevelopment legal issues.
Except for the mootness issue, the decisions have left these issues
unresolved. For instance, can the government take a private party’s
unblighted property merely because it is situated amongst other
properties which are blighted? Can the government decide that
even though the project area is not currently blighted it is outdated
and improperly developed requiring redevelopment to avoid
stagnation? Or, can the government determine that one type of
business is better for an area than another type of business and
meet the public purpose constitutional requirement? Walser I and
II put these issues and related issues squarely before the Minnesota
Supreme Court with a compelling fact scenario. The Minnesota
Supreme Court failed to resolve any of these issues. Unfortunately,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision also fails to provide any

123. 641 N.W.2d at 891.
124. See Matter of Welfare of B.C.G., 537 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (finding that individuals may waive both constitutional and statutory rights
unless limited by public policy).
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clarity. Perhaps the United States Supreme Court will grant
certiorari to provide a clear legal standard and define the
constitutional limits of eminent domain.
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